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Abstract
In this paper we prove Chaitin’s “heuristic principle,” the theorems of a finitely-specified theory
cannot be significantly more complex than the theory itself, for an appropriate measure of complexity.
We show that the measure is invariant under the change of the Gödel numbering. For this measure,
the theorems of a finitely-specified, sound, consistent theory strong enough to formalize arithmetic
which is arithmetically sound (like Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with choice or Peano Arithmetic)
have bounded complexity, hence every sentence of the theory which is significantly more complex
than the theory is unprovable. Previous results showing that incompleteness is not accidental, but
ubiquitous are here reinforced in probabilistic terms: the probability that a true sentence of length n
is provable in the theory tends to zero when n tends to infinity, while the probability that a sentence
of length n is true is strictly positive.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem states that every finitely-specified, sound, theory
which is strong enough to include arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete.
Gödel’s original proof as well as most subsequent proofs are based on the following idea:
a theory which is finitely-specified, sound, consistent and strong enough can express sen-
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theory, but can be shown to be true using a proof by contradiction. A true and unprov-
able sentence is called independent. This type of proof of incompleteness does not answer
the questions of whether independence is a widespread phenomenon nor which kinds of
sentences can be expected to be independent.
Chaitin [14] presented a complexity-theoretic proof of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theo-
rem which shows that high complexity is a reason of the unprovability of infinitely many
(true) sentences. This result suggested to him the following “heuristic principle,” a kind
of information-preservation principle: the theorems of a finitely specified theory cannot be
significantly more complex than the theory itself. This approach would address the sec-
ond of the questions above, that is, highly complex sentences are independent, and, as a
consequence, would indicate that independence is pervasive. A formal confirmation of the
pervasiveness of independence has been obtained in [9] via a topological analysis; a quan-
titative result is still missing.
In this paper we prove that a formal version of the “heuristic principle” is indeed cor-
rect for an appropriate measure of complexity; the measure is invariant under the change
of the Gödel numbering. For this measure, δ, the theorems of a finitely-specified, sound,
consistent theory which is strong enough to include arithmetic have bounded complexity,
hence every sentence of the theory which is significantly more complex than the theory is
unprovable. Previous results showing that incompleteness is not accidental, but ubiquitous
are here reinforced in probabilistic terms: the probability that a true sentence of length n
is provable in the theory tends to zero when n tends to infinity, while the probability that a
sentence of length n is true is strictly positive.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we present the background, the
notation and main results needed for our proofs. In Section 4 we discuss some general
complexity-theoretic results which will be used to prove the main result (Theorem 4.6). In
Section 5 we prove that incompleteness is widespread in probabilistic terms. In Section 6
we use the new complexity measure to prove Chaitin’s information-theoretic incomplete-
ness result for the Omega Number. We finish with a few general comments in Section 7.
The bibliography includes a selection of relevant papers and books, but is by no means
complete.
2. Background
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem, announced on 7 October 1930 in Königsberg at the
First International Conference on the Philosophy of Mathematics1 is a landmark of the
twentieth century mathematics see ([31,32,34] for the original paper, [10,35,43,48] for
other proofs and more related mathematical facts, [5,7,13,27,28,35,36,38,46,47,51] for
more mathematical, historical and philosophical details). It says that in a finitely-specified,
sound, consistent theory strong enough to formalize arithmetic, there are true, but unprov-
able sentences; so such a theory is incomplete. A true and unprovable sentence is called
1 Hilbert, von Neumann, Carnap, Heyting presented reports; the conference was a part of the German Mathe-
matical Congress.
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tency means free of contradictions; soundness means that any proved sentence is true.
According to Hintikka [35, p. 4], with the exception of von Neumann, who immediately
grasped Gödel’s line of thought and its importance, incompleteness passed un-noticed in
Königsberg: even the speaker who summarized the discussion omitted Gödel’s result. In
spite of being praised, discussed, used or abused by many authors, the Incompleteness
Theorem seems, even after so many years since its discovery, stranger than most mathe-
matical theorems.2 For example, according to Solovay [37, p. 399]: “The feeling was that
Gödel’s theorem was of interest only to logicians;” in Smoryn´ski’s words [37, p. 399], “It
is fashionable to deride Gödel’s theorem as artificial, as dependent on a linguistic trick.”
In 1974 Chaitin [14] presented a complexity-theoretic proof of Gödel’s Incompleteness
Theorem which shows that high complexity is a reason of the unprovability of infinitely
many (true) sentences. This complexity-theoretic approach was discussed by Chaitin [16–
18,20,21,23] and various authors including Davis [24], Tymoczko [50], Boolos and Jeffrey
[3, pp. 288–291], Svozil [49], Li and Vitányi [40], Barrow [1,2], Calude [4,6], Calude and
Salomaa [11], Casti [12], Delahaye [25]; it was criticized by van Lambalgen [39], Fallis
[30], Raatikainen [45], Hintikka [35].
Chaitin’s proof in [14] is based on program-size complexity (Chaitin complexity) H : the
complexity H(s) of a binary string s is the size, in bits, of the shortest program for a uni-
versal self-delimiting Turing machine to calculate s. The complexity H(s) is unbounded.
The proof shows that for every finitely-specified, sound, consistent theory strong enough to
formalize arithmetic, there exists a positive constant M such that no sentence of the form
“H(x) > m” is provable in the theory unless m is less than M . There are infinitely many
true sentences of the form “H(x) > m” with m > M , and each of them is unprovable in
the theory.
The high H -complexity of the sentences “H(x) > m” with m > M is a source of their
unprovability.3 Is every true sentence s with H(s) > M unprovable by the theory? Unfor-
tunately, the answer is negative because only finitely many sentences s have complexity
H(s) < M in contrast with the fact that the set of all theorems of the theory is infinite.
For example, ZFC (Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with choice) or Peano Arithmetic triv-
ially prove all sentences of the form “n + 1 = 1 + n.” The H -complexity of the sentences
“n + 1 = 1 + n” grows unbounded with n. This fact, noticed and discussed by Chaitin in
[22, Section 6] (reprinted in [21, pp. 55–81] ) as well as by Svozil [49, pp. 123–125], is es-
sential for the critique in [30,45] (cited in [35]); the works [21,22,49] seem to be unknown
to the authors of [30,35,45].
Chaitin’s proof based on H cannot be directly extended to all unprovable sentences,
hence the problem of whether complexity is a source of incompleteness remained open. In
this note we prove that the “heuristic principle” proposed by Chaitin [21, p. 69], namely
that the theorems of a finitely-specified theory cannot be significantly more complex than
2 This is quite impressive, as mathematics abounds with baffling results.
3 Fallis [30, p. 264], argued that Gödel’s true but unprovable sentence G is likely to have excessive H -
complexity. Similarly, if the theory is capable of expressing its own consistency, then the corresponding sentence
is likely to have excessive H -complexity. It would be interesting to have a mathematical confirmation of these
facts.
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between the program-size complexity and the length of the string, our δ-complexity (The-
orem 4.6). The H -complexity of the sentences “n + 1 = 1 + n” grows unbounded with n,
but the “intuitive complexity” of the sentences “n + 1 = 1 + n” remains bounded; this in-
tuition is confirmed by δ-complexity. Note that a sentence with a large δ-complexity has
also a large H -complexity, but the converse is not true. There are only finitely many strings
with bounded H -complexity, but infinitely many strings with bounded δ-complexity.
As a consequence of Theorem 4.6, we prove that the incompleteness phenomenon is
more widespread than previously shown in [14,20,21,31,32] and by the topological analy-
sis of [9]: the probability that a true sentence of length n is provable in the theory tends
to zero when n tends to infinity, while the probability that a sentence of length n is true is
strictly positive.
3. Prerequisites
We follow the notation in [6]. By N = {0,1,2, . . .} we denote the set of non-negative
integers. Further on, logQ denotes the base Q  2 logarithm and logn = log2(n + 1);
α is the “floor” of the real α and α is the “ceiling” of α. The cardinality of the set A
is denoted by card(A). An alphabet with Q elements will be denoted by XQ; by X∗Q we
denote the set of finite strings (words) on XQ, including the empty string λ. The length of
the string w ∈ X∗Q is denoted by |w|Q.
For Q = 2, we use the special set B = {0,1} instead of X2. We consider the following
bijection between non-negative integers and strings on B: 0 → λ, 1 → 0, 2 → 1, 3 → 00,
4 → 01, 5 → 10, 6 → 11, . . . The image of n, denoted bin(n), is the binary representation
of the number n + 1 without the leading 1. Its length is |bin(n)|2 = logn. In general, we
denote by stringQ(n) the nth string on XQ according to the quasi-lexicographical order. In
particular, bin(n) = string2(n). In this way we get a bijective function stringQ :N→ X∗Q;|stringQ(n)|Q = logQ(n(Q − 1)+ 1).
We assume that the reader is familiar with Turing machines processing strings, com-
putability and program-size complexity (see, for example, [3,4,6,26]). The program set
(domain) of the Turing machine T is the set PROGT = {x ∈ X∗Q: T halts on x}; when
T halts on x, T (x) is the result of the computation of T on x. A partial function ϕ from
strings to strings is called partial computable (abbreviated p.c.) if there is a Turing machine
T such that: (a) PROGT = dom(ϕ), and (b) T (x) = ϕ(x), for each x ∈ PROGT . A com-
putable function is a p.c. function ϕ with dom(ϕ) = X∗Q. A set of strings is computable if
its characteristic function is computable. A set of strings is computably enumerable (ab-
breviated c.e.) if it is the program set of a Turing machine.
A self-delimiting Turing machine is a Turing machine T such that its program set is
a prefix-free set of strings. Recall that a prefix-free set of strings S is a set such that no
4 An “approximation” of this principle supported by Chaitin’s proof is that “one cannot prove, from a set of
axioms, a theorem that is of greater H -complexity than the axioms and know that one has done it;” see [21, p. 69],
also Theorem 4.7 in Section 4.
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chine will refer to either a p.c. function with prefix-free domain or a self-delimiting Turing
machine.
Each prefix-free set S ⊂ X∗Q satisfies Kraft’s inequality:
∑∞
i=1 ri ·Q−i  1, where ri =
card{x ∈ S: |x|Q = i}. A stronger result, the Kraft–Chaitin Theorem (see [6, p. 53]), is
essential in algorithmic information theory: Let n1, n2, . . . be a computable sequence of
non-negative integers such that
∞∑
i=1
Q−ni  1. (1)
Then, we can effectively construct a prefix-free sequence of strings w1,w2, . . . such that
for each i  1, |wi |Q = ni .
The program-size complexity of the string x ∈ X∗Q (relative to T ) is HQ,T (x) =
min{|y|Q: y ∈ X∗Q, T (y) = x}, where min∅ = ∞. The Invariance Theorem states that
we can effectively construct a machine U = UQ (called universal ) such that for every ma-
chine T there exists a constant ε > 0 such that for all x ∈ X∗Q, HQ,U(x)HQ,T (x)+ ε. In
what follows we will fix U and put HQ = HQ,U ; in particular, H2 denotes the program-size
complexity induced by a universal (binary) machine. If x is in X∗Q, then x∗ = min{u ∈ X∗Q:
UQ(u) = x}, where the minimum is taken according to the quasi-lexicographical order; it
is seen that HQ(x) = |x∗|Q.
4. Complexity and incompleteness
In this section we introduce the δ-measure and then prove for it Chaitin’s “heuristic
principle”: the theorems of a finitely-specified theory cannot be significantly more complex
than the theory itself.
First we introduce the δ-measure. Recall that UQ is a fixed universal machine on XQ
and HQ = HQ,UQ . In what follows we will work with the function δQ(x) = HQ(x)− |x|Q
(note that −δQ is a “deficiency of randomness” function in the sense of [6, Definition 5.21,
p. 113]). The δ-complexity is “close,” but not equal, to the conditional HQ-complexity, of
a string given its length.
The complexity measures HQ and δQ have similarities as δQ is defined from HQ by
means of some simple computable functions; for example, they are both uncomputable. But
HQ and δQ differ in an essential way: given a positive N , the set {x ∈ X∗Q: HQ(x) N}
is finite while, by Corollary 4.3, the set {x ∈ X∗Q: δQ(x)  N} is infinite. Note that the
conditional HQ-complexity does not have this property. A sentence with a large δQ-
complexity has also a large HQ-complexity, but the converse is not true. For example,
the HQ-complexity of a (true) sentence of the form “1 +n = n+ 1” is about logQ n plus
a constant, a function which tends to infinity as n → ∞; however, their δQ-complexity is
bounded.
In view of in [6, Theorem 5.4, p. 102], there exists a constant c > 0 such that
( )max|x|Q=N
δQ(x)HQ stringQ(N) − c, (2)
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The following result is taken from [6, Theorem 5.31, p. 117].
Theorem 4.1. For every t  0, the set CQ,t = {x ∈ X∗Q: δQ(x) > −t} is immune, that is,
the set is infinite and contains no infinite c.e. subset.
Corollary 4.2. For every t  0, the set ComplexQ,t = {x ∈ X∗Q: δQ(x) > t} is immune.
Proof. As ComplexQ,t ⊂ CQ,t and every infinite subset of an immune set is immune itself,
we only need to show that ComplexQ,t is infinite. To this aim we use formula (2) and the
fact that the function HQ(stringQ(N)) is unbounded. 
Corollary 4.3. For every t  0, the set {x ∈ X∗Q: δQ(x) t} is infinite.
Proof. The set in the statement is not even c.e. because, by Corollary 4.2, its complement
is immune. 
The above result suggests that any “reasonable” theory cannot include more than finitely
many theorems with high δ-complexity. And, indeed, a simple analysis confirms this fact.
A formal language used by a theory capable of speaking about natural numbers includes
variables (a fixed variable x and the sign ′ may be used to generate all variables, x, x′, x′′,
etc.), the constant 0, function symbols for successor, addition and multiplication, s,+, ·,
the sign for equality, =, logical connectives,¬,∧,∨,⇒, quantifiers, ∀,∃, and parentheses,
(, ). They form an alphabet X15.5 The formal language consists of well-formed formulae
which respect strict syntactical rules; for example, each left parenthesis has to be matched
with exactly one right parenthesis. Theorems are then defined by specifying the axioms
and the inference rules. For instance, the system Q introduced by R.M. Robinson (see,
for example, [29]) contains the logical axioms (propositional, substitution, ∀-distribution,
equality axioms) and the following seven axioms:
Q1 (s(x) = s(x′)) ⇒ (x = x′),
Q2 ¬(0 = s(x)),
Q3 (¬(x = 0)) ⇒ ∃x′(x = s(x′)),
Q4 x + 0 = x,
Q5 x + s(x′) = s(x + x′),
Q6 x · 0 = 0,
Q7 x · s(x′) = (x · x′)+ x,
and the inference rules of modus ponens and generalization. A proof in the system Q
is a sequence of well-formed formulae such that each formula is either an axiom, or is
derived from two earlier formulae in the sequence by an inference rule. Theorems are well-
formed formulae which have proofs in Q. As theorems are special well-formed formulae,5 Of course, we can work with smaller or larger alphabets, depending on specific needs.
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precisely, H15(x) is not larger than its length plus a fixed constant. Such a remark suggests
that Chaitin’s “heuristic principle” may be true for δ15. However, this property could be a
consequence of some particular way of writing/coding the theorems! To be able to measure
somehow the “intrinsic” complexity of a theorem we need to prove that the property is
invariant with respect to a system of acceptable names, in our case, Gödel numberings.
To make the discussion precise, let us fix a formal language L ⊂ X∗Q. A Gödel number-
ing for L is a computable, one-to-one function g :L → B∗, i.e. a system of unique binary
names for the well-formed formulae of L. For example, a Gödel numbering for the well-
formed formulae of the system Q can be obtained by coding the elements of the alphabet
X15 with the first 15 binary strings of length four, and then extend this coding according to
the syntax of the language. Various other possibilities can be imagined; see, for example,
[3,29].
As the set of theorems is a c.e. subset of the set of well-formed formulae, we will work
only with computable, one-to-one functions g :T → B∗ defined on the set of theorems.
The δ-complexity of a theorem u ∈ T induced by the Gödel numbering g is defined by
δg(u) = H2
(
g(u)
)− log2 Q · |u|Q. (3)
The formula for δf is essentially the formula defining δQ relativized to the Gödel num-
bering g: the factor log2 Q has the role of “adjusting” the sizes of the alphabets XQ
and B .
The first result confirms the intuition: we prove that δg is, up to an additive constant,
equal to log2 Q · δQ.
Theorem 4.4. Let T ⊂ X∗Q be c.e. and g :T → B∗ be a Gödel numbering. Then, there
effectively exists a constant c (depending upon UQ,U2, and g) such that for all u ∈ T we
have
∣∣δg(u) − log2 Q · δQ(u)
∣∣ c. (4)
Proof. First we prove the existence of a constant c1 such that
δg(u) log2 Q · δQ(u) + c1. (5)
For each string w ∈ PROGUQ we define nw = log2 Q · |w|Q, and we note that
∑
w∈PROGUQ
2−nw =
∑
w∈PROGUQ
2−log2 Q·|w|Q 
∑
w∈PROGUQ
Q−|w|Q  1,
because PROGUQ is prefix-free. Using now the Kraft–Chaitin Theorem, we can effectively
construct, for every w ∈ PROGUQ a binary string sw such that |sw|2 = nw and the set{sw: w ∈ PROGUQ} is c.e. and prefix-free. This allows us to construct the machine C
defined by
( )
C(sw) = g UQ(w) , for w ∈ PROGUQ.
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(
UQ(w
∗)
)= g(w) we have
HC
(
g(w)
)
 |sw∗ |2 = log2 Q · |w∗|Q = log2 Q ·HQ(w).
Applying the Invariance Theorem, we get a constant c1 > 0 such that
δg(w) = H2
(
g(w)
)− log2 Q · |w|Q  log2 Q ·
(
HQ(w)− |w|Q
)+ c1
= log2 Q · δQ(w)+ c1,
which proves (5).
Secondly, we prove the existence of a constant c2 such that
log2 Q · δQ(u) δg(u) + c2. (6)
For each w ∈ PROGU2 such that |w|2  log2 Q, we put mw =
⌈|w|2 · logQ 2
⌉
 1 and
note that
∑
w∈PROGU2 ,|w|2log2 Q
Q−mw 
∑
w∈PROGU2 ,|w|2log2 Q
2−|w|2  1,
hence, in view of the Kraft–Chaitin Theorem, we can effectively construct, for every w ∈
PROGU2 with |w|2  log2 Q, a string tw ∈ X∗Q of length |tw|Q = mw such that the set{tw: w ∈ PROGU2} is c.e. and prefix-free. In this way we construct the machine D defined
by D(tw) = u if U2(w) = g(u). This construction is well-defined because g is a Gödel
numbering. It is seen that if U2(w) = u and |w|2  log2 Q, then HD(u) |w|2 · logQ 2,
so applying the Invariance Theorem we get a constant d such that
log2 Q ·HQ(u) log2 Q ·HD(u) + d H2
(
g(u)
)+ d,
hence there is a constant c2 such that (6) becomes true. We have used the fact that log2 Q·
m · logQ 2m, for all integers m > 0.
Finally, (4) follows from (5) and (6). 
As a consequence, asymptotically, the δ-measure is independent of the Gödel number-
ing.
Corollary 4.5. Let T ⊂ X∗Q be c.e. and g,g′ :T → B∗ be two Gödel numberings. Then,
there effectively exists a constant c (depending upon U2, g and g′) such that for all u ∈ T
we have
∣∣ ∣∣δg(u) − δg′(u)  c. (7)
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direct proof. To this aim consider the machine C defined for w ∈ B∗ by C(w) = g(u) if
U2(w) = g′(u). The definition is correct because PROGC ⊂ PROGU2 and g is computable
and one-to-one. If U2(s) = g′(u), then C(s) = g(u), so by the Invariance Theorem there
exists a constant c1 such that for all u ∈ L, δg(u)  δg′(u) + c1. Finally, (7) follows by
symmetry. 
Theorem 4.6. Consider a finitely-specified, arithmetically sound (i.e. each arithmetical
proven sentence is true), consistent theory strong enough to formalize arithmetic, and de-
note by T its set of theorems written in the alphabet XQ. Let g be a Gödel numbering
for T . Then, there exists a constant N , which depends upon UQ, U2 and T , such that T
contains no x with δg(x) > N .
Proof. Because of syntactical constraints, there exists a positive constant d such that for
every x ∈ T , HQ(x) |x|Q + d , i.e. δQ(x) d (see also the discussion of the system Q
following Corollary 4.3). Hence in view of Theorem 4.4, there is a constant N  d such
that for every x ∈ T , δg(x)N . 
Every sentence x in the language of T with δg(x) > N is unprovable in the theory;
every such “true” sentence is thus independent of the theory.
Do we have examples of such sentences? First, Chaitin’s sentences of the form
“H2(x) > n,” for large n are such examples.
Here is another way to construct true sentences of high δ-complexity. A formula ϕ(x)
in the language of arithmetic is called Σ1 if it is of the form (∃y)θ(x, y), where θ contains
only two free variables x and y. We write N |= ϕ(n) to mean that ϕ(n) is true when n is
interpreted as a non-negative integer. The Representation Theorem (see [48]) states that a
set R ⊂N is c.e. iff there (effectively) exists a Σ1 formula ϕ(x) such that for all n ∈N we
have: n ∈ R ⇔ N |= ϕ(n).
For every a ∈ N, the set {n ∈ N: δQ(stringQ(n)) a} is c.e., so in view of the Repre-
sentation Theorem there exists a Σ1 formula ϕ (depending on UQ,a) such that for every
n ∈ N we have: δQ(stringQ(n))  a ⇔ N |= ϕ(n). Consequently, the formula ψ = ¬ϕ
represents the predicate “δQ(stringQ(n)) > a.” Because of consistency and soundness, by
enumerating the theorems in T of the form ψ(m) (corresponding to true formulae ψ(m))
we get an enumeration of the set {x ∈ T : ψ(string−1Q (x)) ∈ T } ⊂ {x ∈ T : δQ(x) > a}.
Now let a be a non-negative integer. As {x ∈ T : ψ(string−1Q (x)) ∈ T } is a c.e. subset of
the immune set {x ∈ X∗Q: δQ(x) > a}, it has to be finite, that is, there exists an M ∈N such
that for every x ∈ T with ψ(string−1Q (x)) ∈ T we have: |x|Q M . We have got Chaitin’s
statement [21, p. 69]:
Theorem 4.7. Every finitely-specified, arithmetically sound, consistent theory strong
enough to formalize arithmetic can prove only, for finitely many of its theorems, that they
have high δ-complexity.
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with small δ-complexity, but is incapable of proving more than finitely many instances:
almost all true formulae of the form ψ(m) are unprovable.
Comments. (a) Theorem 4.6 establishes a limit on the δg-complexity of provable sentences
in T ; the bound depends upon the chosen Gödel numbering g. In this approach, it makes
no sense to measure the power of the theory by its complexity, i.e. through the minimal N
such that the theory proves no sentence x with δg(x) > N (see also the discussion in [39]).
(b) Theorem 4.6 does not hold true for an arbitrary finitely-specified theory as there are
c.e. sets containing strings of arbitrary large δ-complexity.
(c) It is possible to have incomplete theories without high δ-complexity sentences; for
example, an incomplete theory for propositional tautologies.
5. Is incompleteness widespread?
The first application complements the result of [9] stating that the set of unprovable
sentences is topologically large. We probabilistically show that only a few true sentences
can be proven in a given theory, but the set of true sentences is “large.”
We begin with the following result.
Proposition 5.1. Let N > 0 be a fixed integer, T ⊂ X∗Q be c.e. and g :T → B∗ be a Gödel
numbering. Then,
lim
n→∞Q
−n · card{x ∈ X∗Q: |x|Q = n, δg(x)N
}= 0. (8)
Proof. We present here a direct proof.6 In view of Theorem 4.4, there exists a constant
c > 0 such that
{
x ∈ X∗Q: |x|Q = n, δg(x)N
}⊆ {x ∈ X∗Q: |x|Q = n, log2 Q · δQ(x)N + c
}
.
So, we only need to evaluate the limit
lim
n→∞Q
−n · card{x ∈ X∗Q: |x|Q = n, δQ(x)M
}= 0, (9)
where M = (N + c)/log2 Q.
First, we note that for every n we have: {x ∈ X∗Q: |x|Q = n, δQ(x)M} = {x ∈ X∗Q:|x|Q = n, ∃y ∈ X∗Q(|y|Q  n+M, UQ(y) = x)}, so
card
{
x ∈ X∗Q: |x|Q = n, δQ(x)M
}
 card
{
y ∈ X∗Q: |y|Q  n +M,
∣∣UQ(y)
∣∣
Q
= n}
 card
{
y ∈ X∗Q: |y|Q  n +M, UQ(y) halts
}
.
6 Alternatively, one can evaluate the size of the set of strings of a given length having almost maximum δQ-
complexity.
C.S. Calude, H. Jürgensen / Advances in Applied Mathematics 35 (2005) 1–15 11Consequently,
lim
n→∞Q
−n · card{x ∈ X∗Q: |x|Q = n, δQ(x)M
}= lim
n→∞
n+M∑
i=1
Q−n · ri , (10)
where ri = card{y ∈ X∗Q: |y|Q = i, ] UQ(y) halts}. Using the Stolz–Cesaro Theorem, we
get
lim
n→∞
n+M∑
i=1
Q−n · ri = QM · lim
m→∞
m∑
i=1
Q−i · ri = QM/(Q − 1) · lim
m→∞Q
−m · rm = 0,
(11)
due to Kraft’s inequality
∑∞
i=1 ri ·Q−i  1. So, in view of (9)–(11), we get (8).
Theorem 5.2. Consider a consistent, sound, finitely-specified theory strong enough to for-
malize arithmetic. The probability that a true sentence of length n is provable in the theory
tends to zero when n tends to infinity, while the probability that a sentence of length n is
true is strictly positive.
Proof. We fix a consistent, sound, finitely-specified theory, let T be its set of theorems and
let g be a Gödel numbering of T . For every integer n  1, let T n = {x ∈ T : |x|Q = n}.
By Theorem 4.6, there exists a positive integer N such that T ⊆ {x ∈ X∗Q: δg(x)  N}.
Consequently, for every n: T n ⊆ {x ∈ X∗Q: |x|Q = n, δg(x)N}, so in view of Proposi-
tion 5.1, the probability that a sentence of length n is provable in the theory tends to zero
when n tends to infinity.
Next consider the sentences hx,m = “HQ(x) > m,” where x is a string over the alphabet
XQ. For every m 1 there exists a positive integer Nm such that for every string x ∈ X∗Q
of length |x|Q > Nm, hx,m is true.
For each fixed m, |hx,m|Q = |x|Q + c, so for every m 1 and nNm + c we have:
card
{
w ∈ X∗Q: |w|Q = n, w is true
} ·Q−n  card{x ∈ X∗Q: |x|Q = n − c
} ·Q−n Q−c,
showing that the probability that a sentence of length n is true is strictly positive. 
6. Incompleteness and ΩU
The second application is to use δ to prove Chaitin’s Incompleteness Theorem for ΩU
[16] (see also the analysis in [6,8,25]). This shows that δ is a “natural” complexity. We start
with the following preliminary result.
Lemma 6.1. Let x1x2 · · · be an infinite binary sequence and let F be a strictly increasing
function mapping positive integers to positive integers. If the set {(F (i), xF(i)): i  1}
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function of the set) such that for all k  1 we have:
δ2(x1x2 · · ·xF(k)) ε − k. (12)
Proof. To prove (12), for k  1 we consider the strings:
w1xF(1)w2xF(2) · · ·wkxF(k), (13)
where each wj is a string of length F(j)−F(j − 1)− 1,F (0) = 0. In this way, we effec-
tively generate all binary strings of length F(k) in which the bits on the “marked”positions
F(1), . . . ,F (k) are fixed.
It is clear that
∑k
i=1 |wi | = F(k)−k and the mapping (w1,w2, . . . ,wk) → w1w2 · · ·wk
is bijective, hence to generate all strings of the form (13) we only need to generate all
strings of length F(k) − k. Hence, we consider the enumeration of all strings of the form
(13) for k = 1,2, . . . . The lengths of these strings form the sequence
F(1),F (1), . . . ,F (1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2F(1)−1times
, . . . ,F (k),F (k), . . . ,F (k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2F(k)−k times
, . . .
which is computable and satisfies the inequality (1) as ∑∞k=1 2F(k)−k · 2−F(k) = 1. Hence,
by the Kraft–Chaitin Theorem, for every string w of length F(k)−k there effectively exists
a string zw having the same length as w such that the set {zw ∈ B∗: |w|2 = F(k)−k, k  1}
is prefix-free. Indeed, from a string w of length F(k) − k, we get a unique decomposition
w = w1 · · ·wk , and zw as above, so we can define C(zw) = w1xF(1)w2xF(2) · · ·wkxF(k); C
is a machine. Clearly, δC(w1xF(1)w2xF(2) · · ·wkxF(k)) |zw|2 −F(k) = −k, for all k  1.
So by the Invariance Theorem, we get the inequality (12).
Consider now Chaitin’s Omega Number, the halting probability of U : ΩU = 0.ω1ω2 · · ·,
see [15]. The binary sequence ω1ω2 · · · is (algorithmically) random. There are various ways
to characterize randomness (see, for example, [6,18,26]). A particular useful way is the
following complexity-theoretic criterion due to Chaitin: there exists a positive constant µ
such that for every n 1,
δ2(ω1ω2 · · ·ωn)−µ. (14)
The condition (14) is equivalent to ∑∞n=0 2−δ2(ω1ω2···ωn) < ∞, cf. [42].
It is easy to see that the inequality (12) in Lemma 6.1 contradicts (14), so a sequence
x1x2 · · ·xn · · · satisfying the hypothesis of Lemma 6.1 cannot be random.
Theorem 6.2. Consider a consistent, sound, finitely-specified theory strong enough to for-
malize arithmetic. Then, we can effectively compute a constant N such that the theory
cannot determine more than N scattered digits of ΩU = 0.ω1ω2 · · · .
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Then, we could effectively enumerate an infinite sequence of digits of ΩU , thus satisfying
the hypothesis of Lemma 6.1 which would contradict the randomness of ω1ω2 · · · . 
7. Conclusions
There are various illuminating proofs of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem and some
interesting examples of true but unprovable sentences (see, for example, [21,33,44]). Still,
the phenomenon of incompleteness seems, even after almost 75 years since its discov-
ery, strange and to a large extent irrelevant to ‘mainstream mathematics,’ whatever this
expression might mean. Something is missing from the picture. Of course, the ‘grand
examples’ are missing; for example, no important open problem except Hilbert’s tenth
problem, see [41], was proved to be unprovable. Other questions of interest include the
source of incompleteness and how common the incompleteness phenomenon is. These
two last questions have been investigated in this note.
Chaitin’s complexity-theoretic proof of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem [14] shows
that high complexity is a sufficient reason for the unprovability of infinitely many (true)
sentences. This approach suggested that excessive complexity may be a source of in-
completeness, and, in fact, Chaitin (in [21,22]) stated this as a “heuristic principle:”
“the theorems of a finitely-specified theory cannot be significantly more complex than
the theory itself.” By changing the measure of complexity, from program-size H(x) to
δ(x) = H(x) − |x|, we have proved (Theorem 4.6) that for any finitely-specified, sound,
consistent theory strong enough to formalize arithmetic (like Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory
with choice or Peano Arithmetic) and for any Gödel numbering g of its well-formed for-
mulae, we can compute a bound N such that no sentence x with complexity δg(x) > N
can be proved in the theory; this phenomenon is independent on the choice of the Gödel
numbering. For a theory satisfying the hypotheses of Theorem 4.6, the probability that a
true sentence of length n is provable in the theory tends to zero when n tends to infinity,
while the probability that a sentence of length n is true is strictly positive. This result rein-
forces the analysis in [9] which shows that the set of independent sentences is topologically
large.
According to Theorem 4.6, sentences expressed by strings with large δg-complexity
are unprovable. Is the converse implication true? In other words, given a theory as in the
statement of Theorem 4.6, are there independent sentences x with low δg-complexity?
Even if such sentences do exist, in view of Theorem 5.2, the probability that a true sentence
of length n with δg-complexity less than or equal to N is unprovable in the theory tends to
zero when n tends to infinity.
Other open questions which are interesting to study include:
(a) the complexity of some concrete independent sentences, like the sentence expressing
the consistency of the theory itself,
(b) the problem of finding other (more interesting?) measures of complexity satisfying
Theorem 4.6,
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sentence of length n, expressible in the language of the theory, is provable in the theory
tends to zero when n tends to infinity.
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